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ABSTRACT
Foreign Direct Investment and Perceptions of Vulnerability to Foreign Exchange Crises:
Evidence from Transition Economies
We show that the imputation of reinvested profits of the subsidiaries of foreign firms as a debit
item on a host country's balance of payments account tends to overstate the current account
deficit and to make the host country seem more vulnerable to financial crisis. We also show that,
because of the workings of the FDI financial life cycle, this phenomenon is most evident for
countries that have recently received large inflows of capital. The transition economies of East
Europe certainly fall among such countries, and we show that, for the Czech Republic and
Hungary, this imputation has a large effect on their reported current account balance. We verify
the working of the FDI financial life cycle using a panel of transition economies.
Key Words: balance of payments, foreign exchange crisis, foreign direct investment,
transition economies
JEL Classification Numbers: F21, F23, F34,3
1. INTRODUCTION
While currency crises have a variety of causes (Eichengreen et al., 1996; Goldstein et al.,
2000; Krugman, 2000; Summers, 2000), both the economic literature and practical experience
with crises show that the ability to forecast them remains controversial.
1 Despite this,
international lenders, organizations like the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the economic
press, have adopted certain “rules of thumb” that serve, if not as predictors of crises, then at least
as warning signs that countries that violate such rules of thumb are in danger of experiencing a
currency crisis or speculative attack on their currencies. Perhaps the best known of these informal
rules is that a country's current account deficit should not exceed five percent of GDP. For
example, Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1996), observe that “[c]onventional wisdom is that current
account deficits above 5% of GDP flash a red light, in particular if the deficit is financed with
short-term debt…” and Summers (1996) warns that “close attention should be paid to any current
account deficit in excess of 5% of GDP….” Such high and sustained current account deficits are
viewed as precursor to a currency crisis because they are often financed by short-term capital
inflows into the country, and such inflows are subject to sudden reversals.
In this paper we call attention to an anomaly in the balance of payments accounting framework
that tends to overstate the current account deficit of countries that are net recipients of foreign
direct investment (FDI) and especially of those countries that are experiencing, or that have
recently experienced, large inflows of FDI. The anomaly is due to the imputation of the
reinvestment of profits by foreign-owned affiliates as a debit item on the host country's current
account even though such reinvestment involves no transactions on the foreign exchange market
and, of course, represents a much more stable form of financing than do short-term capital
                                                  
1 See Goldfajn and Valdés (1998), Berg and Pattillio (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Burkart and Coudret (2002).4
inflows. We also show that this bias is of considerable quantitative significance for a number of
developing countries and particularly so for the transition economies of Eastern Europe.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we show how
reinvested profits of foreign firms are imputed as a debit item on the current account. In section
three we discuss the factors that determine the magnitude of the distortion in the current account
balance that this imputation causes, and we show that, for a number of countries, and particularly
for some of the transition economies of East Europe and the former Soviet Union, such reinvested
profits may actually represent a very significant part of the observed current account deficit. In
Section four we use a panel of transition economies to verify the working of the FDI financial life
cycle.
2. WHY SOME COUNTIES' CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT IS "OVERSTATED"
Normally, a transaction is recorded on the balance of payments when the domestic and foreign
currencies are exchanged between the residents of a country and the rest of the world. Such
exchanges usually have a counterpart transaction on the foreign exchange market. However,
according to the IMF Fifth Balance of Payments Manual (1993), in some cases where no actual
currency flows between a country's residents and the rest of the world occur, transactions are
nevertheless imputed and entries are made in the balance of payments accounts. The reinvested
earnings of foreign-owned affiliates are an example of such an imputed entry in the balance of
payments because the earnings of the foreign-owned affiliate, whether distributed in the form of
dividends paid to the parent firm or reinvested in the affiliate that generates the earnings, are
included in the balance of payments as a deficit item on the current account. In the case of
dividends remitted to the parent company, the rationale for the entry is obvious because host-
country currency has to be converted into the currency of the country that is the MNC's home. In5
the case of profits that are reinvested in the host-country affiliate, however, there is no exchange
of home-country currency for foreign exchange. Reinvested profits earned in the host country's
currency are spent in the host country. Nevertheless, these profits reinvested in the local affiliate
of a foreign-owned firm are treated as a current-account deficit item, that is, as an exchange of
local currency for foreign currency, even though no such exchange takes place. Such an
imputation is necessary to preserve the double-entry nature of the balance of payments account,
which requires the balance of payments to account for an increase in the value of foreigners' asset
holdings in the host country (Box 1).
As Box 1 shows, reinvested earnings are reported as a credit item on the financial account as
part of FDI to reflect foreign investors' increased asset holdings in the host country. To offset this
credit item and to maintain the double-entry nature of the balance of payments, the reinvestment
of earnings by foreign-owned affiliates is also recorded as a debit on the current account. A net
inflow of reinvested earnings into the domestic economy has a positive impact on the capital
account in the form of foreign direct investment, but the impact on net income receipts within the
current account is of an equal, but opposite, amount. Thus, countries that have received large
inflows of FDI that generates large profits that are reinvested in the local economy will,
paradoxically, appear to have large current account deficits even though the reinvested profits
purchase local inputs such as land, structures, etc., and require no foreign exchange financing.
While it is true that proponents of the "five-percent rule" emphasize the need to consider the way
in which the current account deficit is financed, in common practice a close analysis of the
financing of the deficit is generally not undertaken, and, therefore, the bias described here, if
quantitatively important, needs to be addressed more seriously in evaluating whether a country’s
current-account deficit is sustainable or not. Moreover, there is some irony to the fact that FDI,6
the most stable source of external finance, and one that Fernández-Arias and Hausmann (2001)
found to actually reduce the risk of currency crises and speculative attacks, is also the one form of
financing that is included in the balance of payments in a way that makes the country appear
more vulnerable to such crises and attacks.
3. IS THE REINVESTED EARNINGS BIAS A LARGE PART OF THE CURRENT
ACCOUNT DEFICIT?
A. The Magnitude of Reinvested Earnings from FDI
Whether the imputation of reinvested earnings in the current account is sufficient to
materially affect the magnitude of a country's external deficit depends on three factors. The first
of these is quantitative. The larger the stock of FDI relative to the size of the economy and the
more profitable are foreign firms, the greater is the pool of money that can be reinvested into the
local affiliates of foreign firms. The second factor is the country-specific characteristics of the
host and home countries that influence the distribution of total affiliate profits into dividends that
are remitted to the parent company and into funds that are reinvested back into the local affiliate.
This decision depends on a variety of factors including perceptions of host country risk; tax
treatment of dividends by the home and host countries; opportunities for extracting funds from
the affiliate through transfer pricing, management fees, etc.; and the attractiveness of alternative
ways of financing the affiliate's investment needs (Robbins and Stobaugh, Ch. 5, 1973).
2 The
third factor consists of the time path of FDI into the host country or, alternatively, the vintage of
the stock of FDI, which affects both the volume of profits and their distribution between
reinvestment and dividends. This third factor we call the FDI financial life cycle.
                                                  
2 Despite the existence of these other options, dividend remittances have accounted for over 50% of the funds flowing from
foreign affiliates to US MNCs in the post-World War II period, and this proportion has shown little change over time.7
The FDI financial life cycle model is described in Figure 1, which presents a stylized
relationship between profits, dividends and reinvested profits over the life of a foreign direct
investment project. At the outset, in what we call Stage 1 in the diagram, the MNC makes an
investment in the foreign country to found an affiliate. At first, the affiliate will operate at a loss.
In the case of an acquisition, this period may be short or non-existent if the acquired firm is, or
can be easily reorganized to become, profitable. In the case of a greenfield investment, during the
time taken to acquire a site, build and equip a production facility, train workers and begin
production, the interest on the capital invested may result in sizable and longer lasting start-up
losses. Thus, in Stage 1, the affiliate operates at a loss and pays no dividends.
In Stage 2, the affiliate begins to operate at a profit as production begins or as the firm
becomes more competitive as the result of the restructuring or other competitive advantages
provided by the parent firm. However, as the affiliate becomes more successful on the market, it
is likely to have significant needs for additional investment, both for working capital as well for
expanding its plant and equipment. Thus, at first, all or most profits will be reinvested to meet
these needs. As time passes and profits continue to grow, the parent firm may begin to require
that the affiliate remit some of the profits in the form of dividends, although the monetary value
of reinvested profits may continue to increase. The length of the second stage will depend, in part,
on the size of the domestic market, which will determine for how long the affiliate can continue
to expand its capacity, on the availability of export markets to the affiliate and on the
attractiveness of alternative ways of financing the affiliate's expansion. In Stage 3, the affiliate
has reached a "mature" stage where its market share and profit margins in the host country have
stabilized. At this point, the parent firm will choose to repatriate a larger share of the profits in the
form of dividends so that these funds can be used to finance investment opportunities that offer8
more dynamic prospects elsewhere, and reinvested earnings will decline both as a share of profits
and absolutely.
3
B. FDI Reinvestment in the Balance of Income - Some Evidence
Table 1 shows how the three determinants of FDI reinvestment discussed above influence
the size of the bias in the current account of four countries, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Ireland
and Portugal. These four countries provide good data on reinvested profits and also illustrate the
significance of the three factors discussed above. The experience of at least three of these
countries also provides striking evidence that reinvested profits can be a very significant
component of the current account deficit.
The importance of the first factor, the amount of FDI and its profitability, is most evident
in a comparison of Ireland with the other three countries. For Ireland, the difference between the
current account with reinvested dividends reported as a debit item and without the inclusion of
reinvested profits is as much as 10 percent of GDP. That is, without the imputation of reinvested
profits by foreign MNCs located in Ireland as a debit item, Ireland's current account surplus
would be higher by about 10 percent of GDP. This difference between the two measures of the
current account surplus is much greater than it is in the other three countries. In part, the greater
gap between the two measures of the current account reflects the fact that the stock of FDI in
Ireland is equivalent to over 40 percent of GDP while for the other three countries, it ranges from
11 to 15 percent of GDP. Moreover, as columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show, FDI in Ireland appears
to be more profitable than it is in the other three countries.
4 Thus the much larger volume of
                                                  
3 An interesting example of the workings of the FDI financial life cycle is provided by Koretz (2002), who writes: "The U.S.
became a debtor nation during the 1990s. Yet until this year it actually received more income from its direct investments overseas
and holdings of foreign financial assets than foreigners received from their U.S. investments." He suggests that this is because "…
a lot of recent direct investment in the U.S. has faced big startup costs. Investment by U.S. companies overseas is older, so it earns
higher returns."
4 It is important to bear in mind that FDI in Ireland may appear more profitable because Ireland's accounting standards may make
it more difficult for MNCs to understate profits through transfer pricing, royalties, management fees, etc.9
MNC profits in Ireland relative to aggregate economic activity does much to explain why the bias
in the measurement of the current account is so large.
Country-specific factors also play a role in the magnitude of the current account bias
caused by FDI. Although Brazil, the Czech Republic and Portugal have similar ratios of FDI to
GDP, an examination of column 4 of Table 1, the percentage of FDI profits that is reinvested in
the country, reveals that Brazil is something of an outlier. In the other two countries, as well as in
Ireland, about half of FDI profits are reinvested. In Brazil, the rate of reinvestment is quite low,
and in some years negligible.
5 As expected, the difference between the Brazilian current account
deficit measured with and without reinvested profits is very small. On the other hand, for the
Czech Republic and Portugal, the difference is appreciable, usually over one percent of GDP for
the Czech Republic and nearly one percent for Portugal. These are significant biases when
considered in the context of the "five percent rule".
Of particular relevance to the transition economies is the FDI financial life cycle's effect
on the volume of reinvested earnings in the current account balance. This is so because the
transition economies have gone from a state where they had virtually no FDI at the start of the
1990s to a situation where some, such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, have FDI
stocks of a magnitude, whether measured relative to GDP or to population, that compares with
many other middle-level income countries that have been receiving FDI inflows for much longer
periods of time. The major difference between the transition economies and other countries then
is not in the stock of FDI but rather in its vintage, and if the vintage of FDI is an important
determinant of its distribution between dividend remittances and reinvested earnings, then the
magnitude of the reinvested earnings bias should be different for transition countries as well.
                                                                                                                                                                    
5 The low rate of reinvestment in Brazil may reflect the country's poor economic performance in the late 1990s.10
      If the FDI financial life cycle model is correct, then, currently, the amount of reinvestment
of MNC earnings in the transition countries is abnormally high and is likely to be increasing
because most of the foreign affiliates are entering or operating in Stage 2 of the FDI financial life
cycle. Only later, as they enter Stage 3, will the bias in their current account steadily diminish as
the reinvestment of earnings drops off and is replaced by dividend repatriation, which, unlike
reinvested earnings, does create claims on the foreign exchange market.
The workings of the FDI financial life cycle are illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the
role that reinvested earnings play in the FDI position and in the balance of income of two
transition economies, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
6 Hungary attracted a large stock of FDI
early on in the transition. This was due to the fact that Hungarian privatization was consciously
designed to attract foreign "strategic" investors for Hungary's state-owned firms and, later,
financial institutions. For the first half of the 1990's Hungary was by far the leader in both the
stock of FDI and annual FDI inflows among the East European transition economies. The Czech
Republic, on the other hand, chose to privatize the bulk of its state-owned firms by means of the
"voucher privatization" that put firms in the hands of domestic rather than foreign owners. While
some Czech firms, SPT Telecom, the telephone monopoly, and the carmaker Škoda being prime
examples, were sold to foreigners, much of the investment in the Czech Republic through
mergers and acquisitions had to wait until then new domestic owners could take control of their
firms and then decide to sell them to foreigners. As a result, much more of the FDI into the Czech
Republic took the form of greenfield investments, which naturally required longer to plan and
implement. Consequently, while the two countries had similar levels of stocks of FDI by the end
of the 1990s, the vintage of Czech investments was considerably newer than Hungary's.11
This timing of FDI in the two countries is reflected in Figure 2, which shows the
contribution of reinvested earnings to both net FDI on the financial account (bars above the zero
line) and to the balance of income on the current account (bars below the zero line). In the case of
the Czech Republic, reinvested earnings are a smaller part of total FDI inflows, but they are a
large part of the deficit on the income balance. The former is due to the fact that most of the stock
of FDI in the Czech Republic has entered the country in the second half of the 1990s so that FDI
inflows from abroad still constitute the main avenue for foreigners to acquire or increase their
investments in the Czech Republic. The FDI financial life cycle suggests that this recent
investment should yield no or low profits or, to the exert that it does yield profits, these should
mainly be reinvested in the Czech affiliates that generate them. Thus, when we examine the
Czech balance of income, these reinvested profits form a large share of the deficit on this balance
because few of the foreign investments in the Czech Republic are sufficiently mature to be in
Stage 3 of the FDI financial life cycle where their profits would be repatriated to the parent
company in the form of dividends.
In Hungary, with its older vintage of FDI stock, total profits on FDI are higher than they
are in the Czech Republic, as the FDI financial life cycle model would predict. Also, reinvested
profits account for a larger share of total FDI flows in Hungary than they do in the Czech
Republic, both because the inflows of new FDI are lower in Hungary than they are in the Czech
Republic and because the earnings of the more mature foreign investments in Hungary are greater
than those of relatively newer investments in the Czech Republic. Moreover, because profits on
FDI in Hungary are higher, as suggested by the FDI financial life cycle model, even if higher
dividends are paid out, there is nevertheless more money to reinvest as well. In Hungary a larger
                                                                                                                                                                    
6 Hungary does not report reinvested earnings on FDI in its balance of payments accounts although the Hungarian national Bank
intends to begin doing so in January 2004. In addition to the OECD (2002) estimates used here, the reader can consult Sass (2002)12
proportion of FDI occurred in the early 1990s, and thus Hungarian FDI projects are more mature,
and some investment projects may be approaching Stage 3 of the FDI financial life cycle. As
more FDI projects enter Stage 3, Hungary shows larger dividend outflows than are evident in the
Czech Republic. Of course, as other investment projects in Hungary enter Stage 2, reinvested
profits will continue to grow as well, even if they do account for a smaller share of the deficit on
the balance of income.
While the data we have presented show that the imputation of reinvested earnings has a
significant effect on the reported current account deficits of the two transition economies, it is
also worthwhile to examine the dynamics of this bias in order to see how it has evolved and what
its likely effect may be in the future. To this end we examine more carefully the case of the Czech
Republic. At the end of the 1990s and in 2000 and 2001, the most important item of the Czech
current account balance, the trade deficit, declined due to favorable developments in the terms of
trade. The services surplus declined only slowly  from 1995 on. Nevertheless, there was a steady
increase in the current account deficit due to the increasing deficit in the balance of income.
In Figure 3, we show the net balances on the income balance of the Czech Republic.
Figure 3 shows that the growth of the income balance deficit was almost entirely due to the
imputation of net reinvested earnings as a debit item on this balance. In 1995, reinvested earnings
played virtually no role in the income balance and perhaps were not even measured or reported as
a separate item in the balance of payments. There was a small surplus in the compensation of
nonresident employees and small deficits in the interest balance and dividends and redistributed
earnings. It was only in 1998 that a deficit in reinvested earnings appeared, and its magnitude was
then about equal to those of the deficits in the interest balance and nonresident employee
                                                                                                                                                                    
for an alternative set of estimates based on national income accounts.13
compensation. Since then, the deficit from reinvested earnings has made up the largest share of
the deficit on the income balance, and it is almost entirely the source of the growth of the income
deficit.
Moreover, not only has the growth of net reinvested earnings driven the income balance
deficit, and, by extension, the current account deficit, but the importance of reinvested earnings to
the current account deficit has also created additional uncertainty about the size of the current
account deficit itself. In Figure 3 we present the preliminary and revised income balance for 2000
and for 2001 as well as final data for previous years. In 2000, the preliminary figures
considerably underestimated the volume of net reinvested earnings. The Czech National Bank
estimates reinvested earnings in the current period through extrapolation, surveys and forecasts,
and estimates based on such methods require larger revisions than do some other entries in the
balance of payments accounts. For example, the Czech National Bank revised the net
reinvestment of profits figure for 2000 upward by 84 percent from the formerly published figure
of CZK 20,000 million to CZK 36,871 million. Figure 3 shows that this revision accounted for
the bulk of the revision in the income balance. More important, as a result of this revision, the
current account deficit jumped to above 5 percent of GDP in 2000, raising concerns about the
long-term viability of the external balance. A revision of similar proportions was required for the
estimated earnings reinvestment of foreign MNCs for 2001, originally published as CZK 32,000
million but revised in 2003 to CZK 64,000 million, pushing the current account deficit to 5.8
percent of GDP and painting a much more pessimistic picture of the Czech economy's external
balance.14
4. THE FDI FINANCIAL LIFE CYCLE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
In the foregoing section we have shown that the bias in the measurement of the current
account deficit caused by reinvested profits on FDI can be quite large, and we have argued that,
on the basis of the FDI financial life cycle, there can be abrupt shifts in the distribution of foreign
investors' profits between dividend repatriation and reinvestment even in the absence of changes
in the business cycle or the political stability of the host country. In this section, we provide more
systematic evidence of the working of the FDI financial life cycle by using data from a sample of
transition economies. Although we previously cast the explanation of the FDI financial life cycle
in terms of a single investment project, the fact that the transition economies began the 1990s
with virtually no accumulated stock of FDI and then experienced rapid increases in this stock
enables us to use macroeconomic rather than project-level data to test for the existence of the this
cycle. In economies that have experienced a long history of FDI inflows, much of the stock of
FDI is of an older vintage, with many investments in stage three, and new FDI inflows are
relatively small compared to the stock of FDI. In such a situation, the effect on the observed
flows of dividends and reinvested earnings attributable to new FDI will be difficult to discern,
even for large new investments. On the other hand, in the transition economies, the vintage of
FDI was changing quickly in the 1990s. There were no investments of old vintage, and, as the
inflows of FDI increased, this led to large and rapid changes in the vintage of the stock of FDI.
Under such circumstances, it should be possible to link the vintage of FDI projects to the flows of
profits, dividends and reinvested earnings that they engender.
The FDI financial life cycle theory has two testable hypotheses, both evident from Figure
1. The first of these is that, with an increasingly older vintage of FDI, the profit rate on FDI
should increase. The second is that, as the vintage of FDI increases and more projects move15
through Stage 2 to Stage 3, the ratio of dividends from FDI to total FDI profits should also
increase. To test these two hypotheses, we compiled data on FDI stocks, profits and dividends for
a sample of ten transition economies, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia for the period 1993-2000.
7 The vintage,
V, of the stock of FDI was defined as:
...










Z FDI FDI FDI
FDI FDI FDI
V Eq. 1
where Z is the year and FDIZ is the inflow of FDI in year Z. We calculated V from 1994 forward,
so that, by definition, V was equal to 1 for 1994. The implicit assumption behind this procedure is
that for the countries in our sample the stock of FDI previous to 1993 was zero. Given the very
small inflows of FDI in the years between the end of communism and 1993, this is not an
unreasonable assumption.
Note that a steady inflow of FDI each year would generate an increasing value for V,
meaning that the vintage of FDI was increasing over time. If our data displayed such a monotone
trend of increasing vintage, our hypothesis tests would be unable to determine whether the
growing profitability of FDI and the increasing proclivity to repatriate profits on FDI through
dividends were really caused by the increase in V or whether we were merely observing a secular
trend. However, because in some years late in the sample period a number of the transition
economies received large inflows of FDI, the values of V that we observe in our sample at times
fall rather than increase as we move through the sample period.
The two equations embodying our hypotheses are thus:
(Pt / Kt) = a + b Vt Eq. 2
                                                  
7 All data were compiled from the web pages of the National Banks these countries and from the IMF Balance of Payments
Yearbook, 2002.16
and
(Dt / Pt) = c + d Vt        Eq. 3
where t is time, Pt is the profits in year t on FDI, Kt is the stock of FDI in year t, and Dt is the
dividends repatriated by foreign investors in year t.
We estimate these two equations for our sample of transition economies using fixed
effects to capture country differences. The results are reported in Table 2. Both of the slope
coefficients are significant and positive. Thus, as the vintage of the stock of FDI becomes older,
the profitability of foreign investments increases, and the share of profits devoted to dividend
repatriation increases. These results suggest that, in the transition economies in our sample, where
the stock of FDI increased from zero to relatively high levels in the course of a single decade,
there is clear and discernable evidence of a systematic relationship between the vintage of the
stock of FDI, its profitability and the allocation of profits between reinvestment and dividend
repatriation. The implication of this finding is that while the external balance of the transition
economies may appear worse than it now is because of the imputation of retained earnings as a
debit item on the current account, in the future, the ratio of retained earnings to profits will
decrease, with a corresponding growth of dividend repatriation, a trend that will put greater
pressure on these countries' currencies.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that the imputation of reinvested earnings as a debit item in the balance of
payments of host countries creates a situation where the current account deficit can appear to be
in deficit even though there is no need to finance some or a large part of this deficit on the foreign
exchange market. We have also shown that, because of the workings of the FDI financial life
cycle, such a bias is most evident for countries that have recently received large inflows of17
capital. Our analysis also shows that two of the transition economies of East Europe, the Czech
Republic and Hungary, have received large inflows of FDI over a short span of years, and this
imputation has had a large effect on their current account balances. We also found econometric
support for the hypothesis that the FDI financial life cycle plays a role in this process.
Countries that do encounter large inflows of FDI, especially if existing stocks of FDI are
relatively small, should take note of, and make an effort to call attention to, this phenomenon so
that foreign investors can evaluate their economic performance more accurately. Moreover,
transition and developing countries that have not reported reinvested MNC earnings in their
balance of payments accounts should take care to do so in order to clarify the financing needs
implied by their reported current account deficits.18
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Box 1
Reinvested Earnings in the IMF Balance of Payments Methodology
A. Current account
1. Trade balance
2. Balance of services
3. Income balance
3.1. Credit
3.1.1. Interest accepted, income from CB reserves
3.1.2. Income from work abroad
3.1.3. Dividends and distributed earnings
3.1.4. Reinvested earnings abroad
3.2. Debit
3.2.1. Interest paid
3.2.2. Payments to foreign workers
3.2.3. Dividends and distributed earnings







1.1.3. Reinvested earnings abroad
1.2. In the reporting economy (credit)
1.2.1. Equity capital
1.2.2. Other capital




D. Net errors and omissions, valuation changes
E. Change in reserves (-increase)
Source: Compiled from IMF, Fifth Balance of Payments Manual, 1993, p. 43-48.21




























1998 1999 2000 2001 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic Hungary
     of which Net Reinvested Earnings (OECD estimates in Hungary)
     Net Income Receipts
Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflow
Balance of Income
     of which Net Reinvested Earnings (OECD estimates in Hungary)
Sources: Czech National Bank, National Bank of Hungary, and OECD Economic Surveys: Hungary, Paris,
Vol. 2002/10, June 2002, p. 38
Reinvested Earnings




Figure 3: Structure of the Balance of Income of the Czech Republic










































































































































1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001
Reinvested Earnings Dividends and Distributed Earnings
Interest Balance Compensation of Employees Balance
Sources: Balance of Payments Statistics at the website of the Czech National Bank (www.cnb.cz); Data on
reinvested earnings available in “Foreign Direct Investment – 2000.” Prague, Czech National Bank,
March 2002; and in “Foreign Direct Investment – 2001.” Prague, Czech National Bank, March 2003.25




















1992 30702 552 175 32%
1993 31994 1631 100 6%
1994 35066 2290 83 4%
1995 39925 2581 384 15%
1996 51125 2705 531 20%
1997 70775 4707 151 3%
1998 102688 5093 124 2%
1999 131264 4221 NA NA
2000 164043 3105 NA NA












1992 6109 1.6 6284 1.6 0.0
1993 -676 -0.2 -576 -0.1 0.1
1994 -1811 -0.3 -1728 -0.3 0.0
1995 -18384 -2.6 -18000 -2.6 0.0
1996 -23502 -3.0 -22971 -3.0 0.0
1997 -30452 -3.8 -30301 -3.8 0.0
1998 -33416 -4.2 -33292 -4.2 0.0
1999 -25335 -4.8 NA NA NA
2000 -24225 -4.1 NA NA NA
2001 -23213 -4.6 NA NA NA
Source: IMF Database; Central Bank of Brazil26


















1997 9234 56 NA NA
1998 14375 347 180 52%
1999 17552 1045 690 66%
2000 21095 1271 955 75%












1998 -1255 -2.2 -1075 -1.9 0.3
1999 -1462 -2.7 -772 -1.4 1.3
2000 -2718 -5.3 -1763 -3.4 1.9
2001 -3273 -5.8 -1265 -2.2 3.6



















1998 24354 18140 5153 28%
1999 42969 21719 9134 42%
2000 65747 21835 10125 46%












1998 826 0.9 5980 6.6 5.7
1999 337 0.4 9471 10.4 10.0
2000 48 0.1 10173 11.0 10.9
2001 -308 -0.3 9410 9.2 9.5


















1996 18947 993 633 64%
1997 18605 1094 713 65%
1998 24465 1520 854 56%
1999 23519 1521 999 66%
2000 28161 1666 622 37%












1996 -4244 -3.9 -3612 -3.4 0.5
1997 -5909 -5.7 -5197 -5.0 0.7
1998 -8179 -6.9 -7325 -6.2 0.7
1999 -9278 -8.5 -8279 -7.6 0.9
2000 -10618 -10.2 -9997 -9.6 0.6
2001 -9928 -9.1 -9100 -8.3 0.8
Source: IMF Database; Central Bank of Portugal28
Table 2: Parameter Estimates for Equations 2 and 3 from Panel Estimation with Fixed
Country Effects for 10 Transition Countries (1993-2000)*





Equation 2 b 0.01344 2.714 0.0087 70 0.4317
Equation 3 d 0.21966 4.309 0.0001 70 0.8033
* Country dummies available from the authors upon request.2008
B01-08 Euro-Diplomatie durch gemeinsame „Wirtschaftsregierung“ Martin Seidel
2007
B03-07 Löhne und Steuern im Systemwettbewerb der Mitgliedstaaten
der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B02-07 Konsolidierung und Reform der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B01-07 The Ratiﬁcation of European Treaties - Legal and Constitutio-
nal Basis of a European Referendum.
Martin Seidel
2006
B03-06 Financial Frictions, Capital Reallocation, and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations
Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B02-06 Financial Openness and Macroeconomic Volatility Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B01-06 A Welfare Analysis of Capital Account Liberalization Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
2005
B11-05 Das Kompetenz- und Entscheidungssystem des Vertrages von
Rom im Wandel seiner Funktion und Verfassung
Martin Seidel
B10-05 Die Schutzklauseln der Beitrittsverträge Martin Seidel
B09-05 Measuring Tax Burdens in Europe Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B08-05 Remittances as Investment in the Absence of Altruism Gabriel González-König
B07-05 Economic Integration in a Multicone World? Christian Volpe Martincus, Jenni-
fer Pédussel Wu
B06-05 Banking Sector (Under?)Development in Central and Eastern
Europe
Jürgen von Hagen, Valeriya Din-
ger
B05-05 Regulatory Standards Can Lead to Predation Stefan Lutz
B04-05 Währungspolitik als Sozialpolitik Martin Seidel
B03-05 Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate
and Teaching to Stay?
Panu Poutvaara
B02-05 Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting Behavior Jan Fidrmuc, Orla Doyle
B01-05 Macroeconomic Adjustment in the New EU Member States Jürgen von Hagen, Iulia Traistaru
2004
B33-04 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability On Foreign
Direct Investment Inﬂows: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B32-04 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Coun-
tries: A Mulitnominal Panal Analysis
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B31-04 Fear of Floating and Fear of Pegging: An Empirical Anaysis of
De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B30-04 Der Vollzug von Gemeinschaftsrecht über die Mitgliedstaaten
und seine Rolle für die EU und den Beitrittsprozess
Martin Seidel
B29-04 Deutschlands Wirtschaft, seine Schulden und die Unzulänglich-
keiten der einheitlichen Geldpolitik im Eurosystem
Dieter Spethmann, Otto Steiger
B28-04 Fiscal Crises in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-structural Cau-
ses
Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B27-04 Firm Performance and Privatization in Ukraine Galyna Grygorenko, Stefan Lutz
B26-04 Analyzing Trade Opening in Ukraine: Eﬀects of a Customs Uni-
on with the EU
Oksana Harbuzyuk, Stefan Lutz
B25-04 Exchange Rate Risk and Convergence to the Euro Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-04 The Endogeneity of Money and the Eurosystem Otto Steiger
B23-04 Which Lender of Last Resort for the Eurosystem? Otto Steiger
B22-04 Non-Discretonary Monetary Policy: The Answer for Transition
Economies?
Elham-Maﬁ Kreft, Steven F. Kreft
B21-04 The Eﬀectiveness of Subsidies Revisited: Accounting for Wage
and Employment Eﬀects in Business R+D
Volker Reinthaler, Guntram B.
Wolﬀ
B20-04 Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Cri-
ses
Jürgen von Hagen, Tai-kuang Ho
B19-04 Die Stellung der Europäischen Zentralbank nach dem Verfas-
sungsvertrag
Martin SeidelB18-04 Transmission Channels of Business Cycles Synchronization in
an Enlarged EMU
Iulia Traistaru
B17-04 Foreign Exchange Regime, the Real Exchange Rate and Current
Account Sustainability: The Case of Turkey
Sübidey Togan, Hasan Ersel
B16-04 Does It Matter Where Immigrants Work? Traded Goods, Non-
traded Goods, and Sector Speciﬁc Employment
Harry P. Bowen, Jennifer Pédussel
Wu
B15-04 Do Economic Integration and Fiscal Competition Help to Ex-
plain Local Patterns?
Christian Volpe Martincus
B14-04 Euro Adoption and Maastricht Criteria: Rules or Discretion? Jiri Jonas
B13-04 The Role of Electoral and Party Systems in the Development of
Fiscal Institutions in the Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries
Sami Yläoutinen
B12-04 Measuring and Explaining Levels of Regional Economic Inte-
gration
Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B11-04 Economic Integration and Location of Manufacturing Activi-
ties: Evidence from MERCOSUR
Pablo Sanguinetti, Iulia Traistaru,
Christian Volpe Martincus
B10-04 Economic Integration and Industry Location in Transition
Countries
Laura Resmini
B09-04 Testing Creditor Moral Hazard in Souvereign Bond Markets: A
Uniﬁed Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence
Ayse Y. Evrensel, Ali M. Kutan
B08-04 European Integration, Productivity Growth and Real Conver-
gence
Taner M. Yigit, Ali M. Kutan
B07-04 The Contribution of Income, Social Capital, and Institutions to
Human Well-being in Africa
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B06-04 Rural Urban Inequality in Africa: A Panel Study of the Eﬀects
of Trade Liberalization and Financial Deepening
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B05-04 Money Rules for the Eurozone Candidate Countries Lucjan T. Orlowski
B04-04 Who is in Favor of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for
EU Membership in the Candidate Countries’ Referenda
Orla Doyle, Jan Fidrmuc
B03-04 Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Opera-
tions Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender
Ulrich Bindseil
B02-04 Total Factor Productivity and Economic Freedom Implications
for EU Enlargement
Ronald L. Moomaw, Euy Seok
Yang
B01-04 Die neuen Schutzklauseln der Artikel 38 und 39 des Bei-
trittsvertrages: Schutz der alten Mitgliedstaaten vor Störungen
durch die neuen Mitgliedstaaten
Martin Seidel
2003
B29-03 Macroeconomic Implications of Low Inﬂation in the Euro Area Jürgen von Hagen, Boris Hofmann
B28-03 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability on Foreign
Direct Investment: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B27-03 The Performance of the Euribor Futures Market: Eﬃciency and
the Impact of ECB Policy Announcements (Electronic Version
of International Finance)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen
B26-03 Souvereign Risk Premia in the European Government Bond
Market (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterladen)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen, Ludger Schulknecht
B25-03 How Flexible are Wages in EU Accession Countries? Anna Iara, Iulia Traistaru
B24-03 Monetary Policy Reaction Functions: ECB versus Bundesbank Bernd Hayo, Boris Hofmann
B23-03 Economic Integration and Manufacturing Concentration Pat-
terns: Evidence from Mercosur
Iulia Traistaru, Christian Volpe
Martincus
B22-03 Reformzwänge innerhalb der EU angesichts der Osterweiterung Martin Seidel
B21-03 Reputation Flows: Contractual Disputes and the Channels for
Inter-Firm Communication
William Pyle
B20-03 Urban Primacy, Gigantism, and International Trade: Evidence
from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. Alwosabi
B19-03 An Empirical Analysis of Competing Explanations of Urban Pri-
macy Evidence from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. AlwosabiB18-03 The Eﬀects of Regional and Industry-Wide FDI Spillovers on
Export of Ukrainian Firms
Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra, Sang-Min Park
B17-03 Determinants of Inter-Regional Migration in the Baltic States Mihails Hazans
B16-03 South-East Europe: Economic Performance, Perspectives, and
Policy Challenges
Iulia Traistaru, Jürgen von Hagen
B15-03 Employed and Unemployed Search: The Marginal Willingness
to Pay for Attributes in Lithuania, the US and the Netherlands
Jos van Ommeren, Mihails Hazans
B14-03 FCIs and Economic Activity: Some International Evidence Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B13-03 The IS Curve and the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Is there
a Puzzle?
Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B12-03 What Makes Regions in Eastern Europe Catching Up? The
Role of Foreign Investment, Human Resources, and Geography
Gabriele Tondl, Goran Vuksic
B11-03 Die Weisungs- und Herrschaftsmacht der Europäischen Zen-
tralbank im europäischen System der Zentralbanken - eine
rechtliche Analyse
Martin Seidel
B10-03 Foreign Direct Investment and Perceptions of Vulnerability to
Foreign Exchange Crises: Evidence from Transition Economies
Josef C. Brada, Vladimír Tomsík
B09-03 The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem: An Analy-
sis of the Missing Central Monetary Institution in European
Monetary Union
Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B08-03 The Determination of Capital Controls: Which Role Do Ex-
change Rate Regimes Play?
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B07-03 Nach Nizza und Stockholm: Stand des Binnenmarktes und
Prioritäten für die Zukunft
Martin Seidel
B06-03 Fiscal Discipline and Growth in Euroland. Experiences with the
Stability and Growth Pact
Jürgen von Hagen
B05-03 Reconsidering the Evidence: Are Eurozone Business Cycles
Converging?
Michael Massmann, James Mit-
chell
B04-03 Do Ukrainian Firms Beneﬁt from FDI? Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra
B03-03 Europäische Steuerkoordination und die Schweiz Stefan H. Lutz
B02-03 Commuting in the Baltic States: Patterns, Determinants, and
Gains
Mihails Hazans
B01-03 Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion im rechtlichen und poli-
tischen Gefüge der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
2002
B30-02 An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Ass-
urance
Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul,
Tim Mennel
B29B-02 Trade Agreements as Self-protection Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B29A-02 Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B28-02 Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B27-02 Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time
Preference
Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B26-02 Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candi-
date Countries
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B25-02 Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors Stefan Lutz
B24-02 The Eﬀects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Stefan Lutz
B23-02 Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Martin Seidel
B22-02 Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse
des Eurosystems
Otto Steiger
B21-02 Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence Within the Tran-
sition Economies and to the European Union: Evidence from
Panel Data
Ali M. Kutan, Taner M. Yigit
B20-02 The Impact of News, Oil Prices, and International Spillovers
on Russian Fincancial Markets
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. KutanB19-02 East Germany: Transition with Uniﬁcation, Experiments and
Experiences
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R.
Strauch, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B18-02 Regional Specialization and Employment Dynamics in Transi-
tion Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B17-02 Specialization and Growth Patterns in Border Regions of Ac-
cession Countries
Laura Resmini
B16-02 Regional Specialization and Concentration of Industrial Activity
in Accession Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Peter Nĳkamp, Si-
monetta Longhi
B15-02 Does Broad Money Matter for Interest Rate Policy? Matthias Brückner, Andreas Scha-
ber
B14-02 The Long and Short of It: Global Liberalization, Poverty and
Inequality
Christian E. Weller, Adam Hersch
B13-02 De Facto and Oﬃcial Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition
Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B12-02 Argentina: The Anatomy of A Crisis Jiri Jonas
B11-02 The Eurosystem and the Art of Central Banking Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B10-02 National Origins of European Law: Towards an Autonomous
System of European Law?
Martin Seidel
B09-02 Monetary Policy in the Euro Area - Lessons from the First Years Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B08-02 Has the Link Between the Spot and Forward Exchange Rates
Broken Down? Evidence From Rolling Cointegration Tests
Ali M. Kutan, Su Zhou
B07-02 Perspektiven der Erweiterung der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B06-02 Is There Asymmetry in Forward Exchange Rate Bias? Multi-
Country Evidence
Su Zhou, Ali M. Kutan
B05-02 Real and Monetary Convergence Within the European Union
and Between the European Union and Candidate Countries: A
Rolling Cointegration Approach
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Su
Zhou
B04-02 Asymmetric Monetary Policy Eﬀects in EMU Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B03-02 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes: An Empirical Analysis
for Transition Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B02-02 The Euro System and the Federal Reserve System Compared:
Facts and Challenges
Karlheinz Ruckriegel, Franz Seitz
B01-02 Does Inﬂation Targeting Matter? Manfred J. M. Neumann, Jürgen
von Hagen
2001
B29-01 Is Kazakhstan Vulnerable to the Dutch Disease? Karlygash Kuralbayeva, Ali M. Ku-
tan, Michael L. Wyzan
B28-01 Political Economy of the Nice Treaty: Rebalancing the EU
Council. The Future of European Agricultural Policies
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B27-01 Investor Panic, IMF Actions, and Emerging Stock Market Re-
turns and Volatility: A Panel Investigation
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. Kutan
B26-01 Regional Eﬀects of Terrorism on Tourism: Evidence from Three
Mediterranean Countries
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B25-01 Monetary Convergence of the EU Candidates to the Euro: A
Theoretical Framework and Policy Implications
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-01 Disintegration and Trade Jarko and Jan Fidrmuc
B23-01 Migration and Adjustment to Shocks in Transition Economies Jan Fidrmuc
B22-01 Strategic Delegation and International Capital Taxation Matthias Brückner
B21-01 Balkan and Mediterranean Candidates for European Union
Membership: The Convergence of Their Monetary Policy With
That of the Europaen Central Bank
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-01 An Empirical Inquiry of the Eﬃciency of Intergovernmental
Transfers for Water Projects Based on the WRDA Data
Anna Rubinchik-Pessach
B19-01 Detrending and the Money-Output Link: International Evi-
dence
R.W. Hafer, Ali M. KutanB18-01 Monetary Policy in Unknown Territory. The European Central
Bank in the Early Years
Jürgen von Hagen, Matthias
Brückner
B17-01 Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline
in Latin American and Carribean Countries
Mark Hallerberg, Patrick Marier
B16-01 Sources of Inﬂation and Output Fluctuations in Poland and
Hungary: Implications for Full Membership in the European
Union
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B15-01 Programs Without Alternative: Public Pensions in the OECD Christian E. Weller
B14-01 Formal Fiscal Restraints and Budget Processes As Solutions to
a Deﬁcit and Spending Bias in Public Finances - U.S. Experi-
ence and Possible Lessons for EMU
Rolf R. Strauch, Jürgen von Hagen
B13-01 German Public Finances: Recent Experiences and Future Chal-
lenges
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R. Strauch
B12-01 The Impact of Eastern Enlargement On EU-Labour Markets.
Pensions Reform Between Economic and Political Problems
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B11-01 Inﬂationary Performance in a Monetary Union With Large Wa-
ge Setters
Lilia Cavallar
B10-01 Integration of the Baltic States into the EU and Institutions
of Fiscal Convergence: A Critical Evaluation of Key Issues and
Empirical Evidence
Ali M. Kutan, Niina Pautola-Mol
B09-01 Democracy in Transition Economies: Grease or Sand in the
Wheels of Growth?
Jan Fidrmuc
B08-01 The Functioning of Economic Policy Coordination Jürgen von Hagen, Susanne
Mundschenk
B07-01 The Convergence of Monetary Policy Between Candidate
Countries and the European Union
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B06-01 Opposites Attract: The Case of Greek and Turkish Financial
Markets
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B05-01 Trade Rules and Global Governance: A Long Term Agenda.
The Future of Banking.
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B04-01 The Determination of Unemployment Beneﬁts Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch
B03-01 Preferences Over Inﬂation and Unemployment: Evidence from
Surveys of Happiness
Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch, Andrew J. Oswald
B02-01 The Konstanz Seminar on Monetary Theory and Policy at Thir-
ty
Michele Fratianni, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
B01-01 Divided Boards: Partisanship Through Delegated Monetary Po-
licy
Etienne Farvaque, Gael Lagadec
2000
B20-00 Breakin-up a Nation, From the Inside Etienne Farvaque
B19-00 Income Dynamics and Stability in the Transition Process, ge-
neral Reﬂections applied to the Czech Republic
Jens Hölscher
B18-00 Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Roy Gardner,
Jürgen von Hagen, Claudia Keser
B17-00 Rückführung der Landwirtschaftspolitik in die Verantwortung
der Mitgliedsstaaten? - Rechts- und Verfassungsfragen des Ge-
meinschaftsrechts
Martin Seidel
B16-00 The European Central Bank: Independence and Accountability Christa Randzio-Plath, Tomasso
Padoa-Schioppa
B15-00 Regional Risk Sharing and Redistribution in the German Fede-
ration
Jürgen von Hagen, Ralf Hepp
B14-00 Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations in Transition Eco-
nomies: The Case of Poland and Hungary
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B13-00 Back to the Future: The Growth Prospects of Transition Eco-
nomies Reconsidered
Nauro F. CamposB12-00 Rechtsetzung und Rechtsangleichung als Folge der Einheitli-
chen Europäischen Währung
Martin Seidel
B11-00 A Dynamic Approach to Inﬂation Targeting in Transition Eco-
nomies
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B10-00 The Importance of Domestic Political Institutions: Why and
How Belgium Qualiﬁed for EMU
Marc Hallerberg
B09-00 Rational Institutions Yield Hysteresis Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B08-00 The Eﬀectiveness of Self-Protection Policies for Safeguarding
Emerging Market Economies from Crises
Kenneth Kletzer
B07-00 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in The EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B06-00 The Demand for Money in Austria Bernd Hayo
B05-00 Liberalization, Democracy and Economic Performance during
Transition
Jan Fidrmuc
B04-00 A New Political Culture in The EU - Democratic Accountability
of the ECB
Christa Randzio-Plath
B03-00 Integration, Disintegration and Trade in Europe: Evolution of
Trade Relations during the 1990’s
Jarko Fidrmuc, Jan Fidrmuc
B02-00 Inﬂation Bias and Productivity Shocks in Transition Economies:
The Case of the Czech Republic
Josef C. Barda, Arthur E. King, Ali
M. Kutan
B01-00 Monetary Union and Fiscal Federalism Kenneth Kletzer, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
1999
B26-99 Skills, Labour Costs, and Vertically Diﬀerentiated Industries: A
General Equilibrium Analysis
Stefan Lutz, Alessandro Turrini
B25-99 Micro and Macro Determinants of Public Support for Market
Reforms in Eastern Europe
Bernd Hayo
B24-99 What Makes a Revolution? Robert MacCulloch
B23-99 Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B22-99 Partisan Social Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B21-99 The End of Moderate Inﬂation in Three Transition Economies? Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-99 Subnational Government Bailouts in Germany Helmut Seitz
B19-99 The Evolution of Monetary Policy in Transition Economies Ali M. Kutan, Josef C. Brada
B18-99 Why are Eastern Europe’s Banks not failing when everybody
else’s are?
Christian E. Weller, Bernard Mor-
zuch
B17-99 Stability of Monetary Unions: Lessons from the Break-Up of
Czechoslovakia
Jan Fidrmuc, Julius Horvath and
Jarko Fidrmuc
B16-99 Multinational Banks and Development Finance Christian E.Weller and Mark J.
Scher
B15-99 Financial Crises after Financial Liberalization: Exceptional Cir-
cumstances or Structural Weakness?
Christian E. Weller
B14-99 Industry Eﬀects of Monetary Policy in Germany Bernd Hayo and Birgit Uhlenbrock
B13-99 Fiancial Fragility or What Went Right and What Could Go
Wrong in Central European Banking?
Christian E. Weller and Jürgen von
Hagen
B12 -99 Size Distortions of Tests of the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity:
Evidence and Implications for Applied Work
Mehmet Caner and Lutz Kilian
B11-99 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B10-99 Financial Liberalization, Multinational Banks and Credit Sup-
ply: The Case of Poland
Christian Weller
B09-99 Monetary Policy, Parameter Uncertainty and Optimal Learning Volker Wieland
B08-99 The Connection between more Multinational Banks and less
Real Credit in Transition Economies
Christian WellerB07-99 Comovement and Catch-up in Productivity across Sectors: Evi-
dence from the OECD
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B06-99 Productivity Convergence and Economic Growth: A Frontier
Production Function Approach
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B05-99 Tumbling Giant: Germany‘s Experience with the Maastricht
Fiscal Criteria
Jürgen von Hagen and Rolf
Strauch
B04-99 The Finance-Investment Link in a Transition Economy: Evi-
dence for Poland from Panel Data
Christian Weller
B03-99 The Macroeconomics of Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch and Andrew J. Oswald
B02-99 The Consequences of Labour Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence
Based on Survey Data
Rafael Di Tella and Robert Mac-
Culloch
B01-99 The Excess Volatility of Foreign Exchange Rates: Statistical
Puzzle or Theoretical Artifact?
Robert B.H. Hauswald
1998
B16-98 Labour Market + Tax Policy in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B15-98 Can Taxing Foreign Competition Harm the Domestic Industry? Stefan Lutz
B14-98 Free Trade and Arms Races: Some Thoughts Regarding EU-
Russian Trade
Rafael Reuveny and John Maxwell
B13-98 Fiscal Policy and Intranational Risk-Sharing Jürgen von Hagen
B12-98 Price Stability and Monetary Policy Eﬀectiveness when Nomi-
nal Interest Rates are Bounded at Zero
Athanasios Orphanides and Volker
Wieland
B11A-98 Die Bewertung der "dauerhaft tragbaren öﬀentlichen Finanz-
lage"der EU Mitgliedstaaten beim Übergang zur dritten Stufe
der EWWU
Rolf Strauch
B11-98 Exchange Rate Regimes in the Transition Economies: Case Stu-
dy of the Czech Republic: 1990-1997
Julius Horvath and Jiri Jonas
B10-98 Der Wettbewerb der Rechts- und politischen Systeme in der
Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B09-98 U.S. Monetary Policy and Monetary Policy and the ESCB Robert L. Hetzel
B08-98 Money-Output Granger Causality Revisited: An Empirical Ana-
lysis of EU Countries (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterla-
den)
Bernd Hayo
B07-98 Designing Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Europe: So-
me Lessons from the U.S. EPA’s 33/50 Program
John W. Maxwell
B06-98 Monetary Union, Asymmetric Productivity Shocks and Fiscal
Insurance: an Analytical Discussion of Welfare Issues
Kenneth Kletzer
B05-98 Estimating a European Demand for Money (überarbeitete Ver-
sion zum Herunterladen)
Bernd Hayo
B04-98 The EMU’s Exchange Rate Policy Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B03-98 Central Bank Policy in a More Perfect Financial System Jürgen von Hagen / Ingo Fender
B02-98 Trade with Low-Wage Countries and Wage Inequality Jaleel Ahmad
B01-98 Budgeting Institutions for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline Jürgen von Hagen
1997
B04-97 Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency: Does
European Monetary Uniﬁcation Create a Need for Fiscal Ins-
urance or Federalism?
Kenneth Kletzer
B-03-97 Liberalising European Markets for Energy and Telecommunica-
tions: Some Lessons from the US Electric Utility Industry
Tom Lyon / John Mayo
B02-97 Employment and EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B01-97 A Stability Pact for Europe (a Forum organized by ZEI)ISSN 1436 - 6053
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Walter-Flex-Strasse 3 Tel.: +49-228-73-1732
D-53113 Bonn Fax: +49-228-73-1809
Germany www.zei.de